How to distribute subsidies for "good public goods"
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In the previous article, Why Public Chain Should Optimize Subsidy Distribution for "Good Public Goods", we talked about how public chains and governments (which we call government functions) have a "matching incentive to develop the ecosystem" (so we should invest).
This time, we will write about the following:
How subsidies have been distributed so far
How they should be distributed
Experimental efforts we are working on
How subsidies have been distributed so far
When you imagine subsidies that the government implements to some extent, there may have been many cases where you explain how attractive your project is through "public offering" or the like for a predetermined frame.
However, this is a method in which a few people with decision-making power who do not directly use the public goods project decide based on them.
If you base it on those people, it is easy to be hacked.
Related: Easy to hack if regulated
How to "decide together" where to distribute
So, what if there is a way for people who use public goods to show "how useful the public goods are?"
Now it gets complicated, so please follow along
Directly collecting "which public goods are superior?" information from the people would be great, but simple voting (One person, one vote) would only be "vote or not," and would not express the "strength of individual preferences."
What is being experimentally proposed to express individual preferences is Quadratic Voting
Not One person, one vote
Vote by consuming credits
When you think it is important, you can consume more credits than usual and cast multiple votes, and it's okay not to vote when you are not interested.
However, something that is widely supported by many people consumes fewer credits in total.
This ethical backing is that "something supported by many people is good."
Voters receive budgets of “voice credits,” which they allocate to different questions on the ballot to signal the intensity of their conviction. Their voice credits convert to “counted votes” according to their square root. So if you put one voice credit on an issue, that is one vote; four credits are two votes; nine credits are three votes, and so on.
https://www.radicalxchange.org/concepts/plural-voting/
There is something called "How to catch VCs at events" that optimizes this Quadratic Voting for fund allocation.
Like Quadratic Voting, one person can put multiple votes (since it is a donation, the amount indicates the strength of preference) on an issue.
A country (such as Ethereum) accumulates a certain amount of money in a "matching pool" and decides to invest it in digital public goods.
This matching pool becomes the total amount of grants to support each project (determined by Quadratic funding).
The amount of grant money distributed from the matching pool varies depending on the amount donated and the number of supporters (donors).
Individual preferences can be indicated by the amount of donation.
This system is also based on the ethics that "what is supported (donated) by many people is good."
Therefore, "by donating $1, the amount that reaches the project can be $27" or something like that can happen.
Related: How Can $1 Turn Into $27? Quadratic Funding Explained
Vulnerabilities of Quadratic funding
However, Quadratic Funding has not only good aspects but also bad ones.
For more details, please refer to "How to Attack and Defend Quadratic Funding" , but what we are focusing on this time is "collusion."
DeCartography to protect against collusion vulnerabilities in QF